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Upping the Ante: Rethinking Anti-SLAPP Laws in
the Age of the Internet
In recent decades, policymakers have made a wager on anti-SLAPP
legislation. Their wager assumes that anti-SLAPP legislation properly
balances the rights of petition and free speech with the right of redress for
defamation. With such vital interests at stake, it may seem odd that
policymakers are basing their bet on decades-old empirical data and a
decidedly narrow theoretical justification. But that is exactly what is
happening with anti-SLAPP legislation. This is particularly troubling
in light of the recent expansion of anti-SLAPP into the realm of
Internet defamation claims, where the stakes for online speakers and
those they speak about are exponentially higher. This expansion of antiSLAPP requires that policymakers reassess the purposes of anti-SLAPP
and ensure that the procedural safeguards they have instituted properly
balance the rights of all interested parties. Accordingly, this comment
argues for an empirical and theoretical rethinking of anti-SLAPP in
light of changed circumstances.
INTRODUCTION
Practically every discussion of anti-SLAPP legislation and
litigation begins with an acknowledgement of Professors George
Pring and Penelope Canan. 1 In fact, the now ubiquitous term
“SLAPP,” an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation,” was coined by Pring and Canan in the mid-1980s. 2
Their ten-year study of 247 separate lawsuits first identified “[a] new
breed of lawsuits . . . stalking America.” 3 These lawsuits, known as
SLAPPs, are a pernicious form of meritless legal action intended
solely to retaliate against the exercise of petition and speech rights.4
Pring and Canan’s exposé of SLAPPs forms the key theoretical

1. See, e.g., Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 427 (Ill. 2012).
2. See GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR
SPEAKING OUT 3 (1996).
3. Id. at 1.
4. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 396 (1993).
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justification 5 (and only empirical basis6) for an ongoing slew of
legislation meant to curb such strategic litigation. At least twentynine states, 7 the District of Columbia, and the territory of Guam 8
have enacted some form of anti-SLAPP legislation since Pring and
Canan first published their study. Recent lobbying efforts by
reporters, 9 citizens’ rights groups, 10 and even the American Bar

5. See Baker & Histetler LLP, A Uniform Act Limiting Strategic Litigation Against
OF
PROF.
JOURNALISTS,
Public
Participation:
Getting
It
Passed,
SOC’Y
http://www.spj.org/antislapp.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2015) (“In California, Senator Bill
Lockyer, a democrat from Alameda County and then-head of the state Judiciary Committee,
was inspired by [George] Pring’s and Penelope Canan’s seminal article on SLAPPs and made it
a mission of sorts to enact an anti-SLAPP law in California.”) [hereinafter A Uniform Act]. It
is also worth noting that the model anti-SLAPP statute outlined by the Society of Professional
Journalists uses Pring and Canan’s empirical data from the 1980s to describe SLAPP statutes
generally and the need for anti-SLAPP statutes specifically. See id.
6. Joseph W. Beatty, Note, The Legal Literature on SLAPPs: A Look Behind the Smoke
Nine Years After Professors Pring and Canan First Yelled “Fire!”, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
85, 94–95 (1997). While the legislative history of anti-SLAPP statutes rarely name-check Pring
and Canan directly, many statutes make identical references to “a disturbing increase in
lawsuits” of the SLAPP variety. E.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/5 (West 2007); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 691
N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998) (citing legislative history and attributing the passage of
Massachusetts’ anti-SLAPP law to a “‘disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress
of grievances”). This assertion of a “disturbing increase” appears to have no empirical basis
other than Pring and Canan’s initial assertions and related scholarship. See PRING & CANAN,
supra note 2, at 3 (indicating that “SLAPPs were ‘reborn’ in the political activism of the 1960s
and 1970s; they grew and multiplied in the 1980s; and in the 1990s they are a major threat to
involved citizens”); see also Barker, supra note 4, at 396.
7. Samantha Brown & Mark Goldowitz, The Public Participation Act: A
Comprehensive Model Approach to End Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation in the
USA, 19 REV. EUR. COMPA. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2010) (U.K.).
8. Kristen Rasmussen, SLAPP Stick: Fighting frivolous lawsuits against journalists: A
state-by-state guide to anti-SLAPP laws, REP. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS,
http://www.rcfp.org/slapp-stick-fighting-frivolous-lawsuits-against-journalists/statutorysolution (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
9. See Jack Komperda, Journalism Advocates Calling for Federal Legislation in Wake of
Phone
Records,
Email
Seizures,
REP. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS,
https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-lawspring-2013/journalism-advocates-callin (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
10. For example, one particularly vocal and well-organized group is the Public
Participation Project, made up of “numerous organizations and businesses, as well as
prominent individuals” based out of California. See Public Participation Project: Fighting for
Free Speech, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/about/staff/ (last
visited Oct. 13, 2015).
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Association 11 aim to pass an anti-SLAPP statute at the federal level to
provide broad-based protection for speech and petitioning. 12
The difficulty with this legislation lies not in its goals, but in its
outdated empirical basis and incomplete theoretical justification. The
push for federal anti-SLAPP legislation and expanded legislation at
the state level is justified by Pring and Canan’s narrow study and
galvanized by stories of brave individuals speaking out against large
corporate interests and being sued into silence. 13 This narrative fails
to account for two recent and substantial shifts in the law and
society: first, the expansion of anti-SLAPP protections beyond Pring
and Canan’s original focus on petitioning activity to any statement in
a public forum in connection to an issue of public interest 14 and,
second, the expansion of public discourse on to the Internet. 15 Taken
together, these two shifts mean that anti-SLAPP laws are now
thoroughly entangled in the web of Internet defamation law. While
such statutes have always balanced the dueling interests of free
speech and redress for defamation, 16 the expansion of anti-SLAPP

11. See AM. BAR ASS’N RES. 115 (August 6–7, 2012), http://www.anti-slapp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/aba.pdf (“[T]he American Bar Association encourages federal,
state and territorial legislatures to enact legislation to protect individuals and organizations
who choose to speak on matters of public concern from meritless litigation designed to
suppress such speech, commonly known as SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation).”).
12. The model statutes proposed by these groups are almost uniformly based on Pring
and Canan’s empirical research and theoretical model. See, e.g., A Uniform Act, supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., id. Under the section heading “Tell A Meaningful Story[,]” the Society of
Professional Journalists’ anti-SLAPP information page reads, somewhat cynically,
Politicians are politicians, and they will be most likely to get behind legislation that
makes them look compassionate. Therefore, it is crucial to set off on the lobbying
trail with some good stories about SLAPP victims, stories that will outrage
lawmakers in their injustice and present them with possible ‘poster children’ for the
new legislation. Even more effective is to enlist the victims themselves to tell their
own stories.
Id. The section goes on to outline several such stories from California, Washington, and New
York, all revolving around individuals and small groups being sued for petitioning government
entities against the economic interests of powerful corporate and business interests (a wasteburning plant and two real-estate developers). Id.
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2015).
15. See, e.g., ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson, 93 Cal. App. 4th 993, 1007 (2001)
(holding that a series of websites were public forums for purposes of California’s antiSLAPP laws).
16. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island succinctly summarized the balancing act
inherent in anti-SLAPP laws when addressing their own state’s law:
By the nature of their subject matter, anti-SLAPP statutes require meticulous
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laws to Internet speech dramatically raises the stakes for both
speakers and those they speak about. For instance, the potential for
viral libel and the permanence of defamatory statements made on the
Internet compound the potential harms to victims of defamation.
On the other hand, even legitimate defamation actions can chill vital
speech on the most crucial public forum of our age—the Internet.
Pring and Canan’s theoretical justification for anti-SLAPP, focused
exclusively on the threat posed by SLAPPs to petitioning activity,
simply does not account for these risks.
Thus, this Comment proposes an empirical and theoretical
reevaluation of anti-SLAPP laws in light of changed circumstances.
Once policymakers have an accurate idea of the reach of anti-SLAPP
laws and the actual interests involved, they can properly calibrate the
standard of proof requirements to match those interests. This
rethinking of anti-SLAPP would ensure that these laws correctly
balance the interests they were designed to address.
Part I of this Comment explains the philosophy and mechanics
of anti-SLAPP statutes. Part II explores the new dynamic created by
the introduction of defamation law to Internet-based speech, with a
focus on blogs, social networks, and consumer review sites. This Part
also links the philosophy of anti-SLAPP laws to this new dynamic.
Part III provides specific examples of the intersection of Internet
defamation and anti-SLAPP laws and explains the application of
these examples to a fundamental rethinking of anti-SLAPP rhetoric
and structure. Part IV summarizes the need for a theoretical and
empirical reevaluation of anti-SLAPP laws, outlines potential starting
points, and concludes.

drafting. On the one hand, it is desirable to seek to shield citizens from improper
intimidation when exercising their constitutional right to be heard with respect to
issues of public concern. On the other hand, it is important that such statutes be
limited in scope lest the constitutional right of access to the courts (whether by
private figures, public figures, or public officials) be improperly thwarted. There is a
genuine double-edged challenge to those who legislate in this area.
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 (R.I. 2008); see also Kathryn W. Tate, California’s AntiSLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 801, 860 (2000) (questioning whether the “very broad scope” of California’s antiSLAPP law is “the best balance between the rights of speech and petition and the right to sue
and get redress for alleged wrongs”).
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I. THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION
In its purest form, a SLAPP involves a filer using the threat of a
lawsuit to intimidate individuals and community groups into silence.
The rhetoric surrounding anti-SLAPP legislation follows a fairly
simple narrative pattern that is drawn from Pring and Canan’s
original theoretical framework. Thus, SLAPPs are typically defined as
meritless and malicious lawsuits, meant entirely to intimidate and
silence legitimate speakers. 17 This cynical use of the legal system is
clearly inimical to free and open debate on public issues and, by
extension, the function of basic democratic institutions. Recognizing
the immediate threat of such lawsuits, the Pring and Canan study
called for legislative action. 18 In the years since Pring and Canan’s
study, twenty-nine states have answered that call by enacting some
form of anti-SLAPP legislation. 19 This Section further outlines the
typical narrative of anti-SLAPP legislation, sketches its function, and
explains its expansion beyond petitioning activity to general
speech rights.
A. The Anti-SLAPP Narrative
Using analysis of thousands of lawsuits nationwide and
interviews with both plaintiffs and defendants, Pring and Canan’s
groundbreaking study first identified SLAPPs as a nationwide trend.
According to the study, SLAPPs are a pernicious form of predatory
legal action intended solely to retaliate against or stop the exercise of
free speech and petition rights. Thus, the goal of a true SLAPP is
neither to win the lawsuit nor to redress any compensable damages. 20
The goal of a SLAPP is straightforward—silence the opposition.21

17. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2015) (“The Legislature finds
and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the
valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of
grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage
continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not
be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.”); A Uniform Act, supra note 5 (“[P]ublic
participation and petition are essential to our democratic process and must be protected from
the threat of SLAPP suits.”).
18. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 188–207.
19. Brown & Goldowitz, supra note 7.
20. SLAPP Stories, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/slappshots/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
21. Tate, supra note 16, at 803–04.
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Filers of true SLAPPs seek to stop public participation by
“drag[ging] citizens out of the political arena and into the
courthouse with staggering personal lawsuits.” 22 For Pring and
Canan, the defining feature and key concern of such SLAPPs was not
“the parties’ subjective motives or good faith or . . . who was right
or wrong on the merits.” 23 Instead, SLAPPs were most readily
defined by “their cause and effect.” 24 That is, SLAPPs “happen when
people participate in government, and [they are troubling because]
they effectively reduce future public participation.” 25 Distilled to its
essence, a SLAPP is “a civil complaint or counterclaim [that is] filed
against nongovernment individuals or organizations . . . on . . . a
substantive issue of some public interest or social significance.” 26
A prototypical SLAPP goes something like this: a citizen,
referred to as a “target,” says something to a government agency
that someone else, referred to as a “filer,” doesn’t like. 27 The filer
typically has some sort of financial interest in the public debate or
government action being taken—be it a real estate development, an
environmental zoning issue, or a political campaign. 28 In order to
silence the target, the filer files a lawsuit, usually alleging some form
of defamation 29 or tortious interference with business practices. 30 The
suit is, by definition, meritless. That is, the filer does not hope to win
the suit. The filer does not care about actual redress of the wrongs
alleged. The filer only wants to tie up the target’s resources in
litigation. 31 If the target’s emotional and financial resources are
dominated by the lawsuit, then she is unable to continue the public
debate. So, the filer demands redress into the millions, 32 drags out
22. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 8–9.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 9–10.
28. See Penelope Canan, The SLAPP from a Sociological Perspective, 7 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 23, 26 (1989).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Protect Our Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361, 1365–66
(Colo. 1984) (describing multiple instances of SLAPP-like actions involving charges of
tortious interference with business practices from various jurisdictions).
31. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2 at 212 (arguing that SLAPPs are “tactics to
drain the resources, commitment, and vocabulary of political debate, [and] are a creative
means for ideologically warring against egalitarian principles of citizen participation”).
32. Canan, supra note 28, at 26 (describing the average demand for redress as
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discovery, and generally makes life miserable until the target either
recants or simply shuts up. 33 The filer then quietly withdraws the
suit, and continues in whatever public issue or debate sparked the
confrontation in the first place. Even after the lawsuit is dropped, the
target is left rattled and defeated, unable or unwilling to continue the
public fight. 34 What is more, others who may share the target’s views
on the public issue or debate are intimidated into silence by the
prospect of winding up in a multi-million dollar lawsuit with
the filer. 35
For a real-life example of a quintessential SLAPP, Canan cites the
case of Parnas Corp. v. Pierce Canyon Homeowner’s Ass’n. 36 In that
case, several homeowners’ associations in the newly booming Silicon
Valley banded together to push back on encroaching real estate
development. The associations pressed for a ballot measure that
would put significant government oversight on developers. Despite
being outspent “eight to one,” the small “grassroots political
organization” managed to pass the ballot measure and to pack the
city council that would oversee implementation. 37 An unsurprisingly
furious real estate developer retaliated by filing a defamation suit
against the homeowners associations, seeking a ludicrous
$40,150,000 in damages. 38 As Canan observes, “The pursuit of the
lawsuit was very telling.” 39 The developer hauled the new city
council members into depositions solely to watch them squirm, sued
various individuals and organizations that had nothing to do with
the alleged defamation, and halted the legal drama only when he had
extracted variances from the city council. 40

$9,000,000).
33. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 6.
34. See id. at 5; see also Robert D. Richards, A SLAPP in the Facebook: Assessing the
Impact of Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation on Social Networks, Blogs and
Consumer Gripe Sites, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 221, 227 (2011)
(describing Canan’s work detailing the psychological and physical tolls of SLAPP suits).
35. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 219.
36. No. 450512 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County filed May 19, 1980); Canan,
supra note 28.
37. Id. at 26–28.
38. Id. at 29.
39. Id. at 28–29.
40. Id. at 29.
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B. Structure of Anti-SLAPP
Anti-SLAPP legislation is meant to turn the tables on SLAPPfilers by providing SLAPP targets with an expedited review of the
case in the form of a special motion to strike. 41 Certain anti-SLAPP
statutes even award full attorney’s fees to defendants if they succeed
in the motion to strike. 42 These statutes provide a safety net for the
targets of SLAPPs, allowing them to quickly and painlessly dispose of
a meritless lawsuit. 43
In 1992, California enacted one of the first anti-SLAPP measures
in the country. 44 The statute has become a model for anti-SLAPP
legislation in other jurisdictions, such as Washington 45 and the
District of Columbia, 46 as well as prominent model statutes drafted
by various special interest groups. 47 The statute provides that “[a]
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to
strike.” 48 That special motion to strike is evaluated based on a twopart test: “First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that
a cause of action arises from an act in furtherance of his or her
constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a
public issue.” 49 Second, once the defendant meets that initial burden,
discovery is frozen, 50 and “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim.” 51 The court
considers the parties’ pleadings and affidavits, as well as any
submitted evidence, “accept[ing] as true the evidence favorable to
41. See A Uniform Act, supra note 5, app. A (explaining the mechanics of an antiSLAPP motion under the heading “What Will Anti-SLAPP Legislation Do?”).
42. Emily Miller, Anti-SLAPP Laws on Trial, REP. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS
(Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/newsmedia-and-law-summer-2012/anti-slapp-laws-trial.
43. See SLAPP Stories, supra note 20.
44. Tate, supra note 16, at 801; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 189.
45. See Alaska Structures, Inc. v. Hedlund, 323 P.3d 1082, 1085 (Wa. 2014).
46. Anti-SLAPP Statutes Spread Across the Nation, SEDGWICK L. (Nov. 10, 2011),
http://www.sedgwicklaw.com/anti-slapp-statutes-spread-across-the-nation-11-10-2011/.
47. See, e.g., Brown & Goldowitz, supra note 7, at 7 n.35.
48. CA. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2015).
49. Birkner v. Lam, 156 Cal. App. 4th 275, 280–81 (2007).
50. Tate, supra note 16, at 801.
51. Birkner, 156 Cal. App. 4th at 281.
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the plaintiff and evaluat[ing] the defendant’s evidence only to
determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter
of law.” 52 This procedural mechanism is intended to weed out
SLAPPs at an early stage before the damaging “chilling effect” takes
hold of either the target or observers in the community. 53
The “genuine double-edged challenge” of anti-SLAPP statutes
lies in balancing two competing interests: the “constitutional right to
be heard with respect to issues of public concern” and the
“constitutional right of access to the courts” belonging to lawsuit
filers. 54 If the burden of proof to survive the motion is too high,
legitimate defamation claims will not be redressed. On the other
hand, if the burden of proof is too low, SLAPPs may go forward
despite anti-SLAPP laws and legitimate speech will be chilled. The
California legislature settled on a relatively middling burden of
proof, a “probability of prevailing on the claim[,]” which may have
been a concession to business interests involved in the
lobbying effort. 55
C. Expansion of Anti-SLAPP
Pring and Canan’s theoretical framework and empirical research
were deliberately limited to speech under the petition clause. 56
Nevertheless, current proponents of anti-SLAPP legislation and
many existing laws have expanded this definition beyond that limited
context to include any suit based on “speech on an issue of public
interest or concern.” 57 For instance, California’s anti-SLAPP law, a
basis for multiple model statutes, 58 provides that an “act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech” includes
“any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 273 (2011).
See A Uniform Act, supra note 5; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 11–12.
Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 (R.I. 2008).
See Tate, supra note 16, at 818 n.86.
See PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 8–9.
Guarding Against the Chill: A Survival Guide for SLAPP Victims, FIRST AMEND.

PROJECT,
http://www.thefirstamendment.org/antislappresourcecenter.html#What%20are%20slapps (last
visited Oct. 10, 2015).
58. See, e.g., Brown & Goldowitz, supra note 7, at 7 n.35; A Uniform Act, supra note
5 (noting, in commentary, that certain provisions of the Society of Professional Journalists’
model statute are drawn directly from or influenced by the California statute).

749

08.ROTH2.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/12/2016 11:34 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest . . . .” 59 This provision expands the reach of the statute far
beyond the petitioning activity that originally concerned Pring and
Canan. 60 One anti-SLAPP proponent explained the expansion as a
natural outgrowth of the original conception of anti-SLAPP:
Originally, SLAPPs were conceived as lawsuits suppressing citizens’
rights to monitor government functions. Over time, we’ve realized
that this construction is too narrow. Although we still need to
protect government watchdogs, we also need to guard against
plaintiffs who use litigation to remove socially valuable content
from our information ecosystem. 61

While this expansion may be ideologically in line with the original
spirit of anti-SLAPP, the practical effects of the expansion are drastic.
In fact, “many questions of defamation law are now resolved in
SLAPP proceedings in [California].” 62 What is more, many courts
consider websites accessible to the public to be “public forums”
within the meaning of anti-SLAPP statutes. 63 As will be explained
below, this expansion has shifted the impact of anti-SLAPP from
straightforward petitioning activity to significantly more fraught
questions of Internet defamation.
II. A NEW DYNAMIC OF COMPETING INTERESTS
Anti-SLAPP laws have always balanced two competing interests:
bedrock First Amendment principles of free and open discourse and
the right to seek redress in a court of law. 64 However, this balance is
made significantly more precarious by the expansion of anti-SLAPP
laws to Internet discourse as described above. On one side of this
balance, the Internet has become a crucial component of public
discourse 65 and is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to the “chilling
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).
60. See Eric Goldman, Why I Support HR 4364, the Proposed Federal Anti-SLAPP Bill,
&
MARKETING
L.
BLOG
(Mar
3,
2010),
TECH.
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/hr_4364.htm.
61. Id.
62. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 261
(8th ed. 2011).
63. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 514 n.4 (Cal. 2006).
64. See Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 150 (R.I. 2008).
65. Robert D. Richards, Sex, Lies, and the Internet: Balancing First Amendment
Interests, Reputational Harm, and Privacy in the Age of Blogs and Social Networking Sites, 8
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effect” of threatened litigation. 66 On the other side of the balance,
the Internet amplifies the harm caused by libelous publications.67
Thus, the advent of the Internet has profoundly affected defamation
law, upping the ante for both those engaged in public discourse and
victims of libelous attacks. This Section will address this dynamic of
competing interests by first sketching the potential “chilling effect”
in Internet discourse and then exploring the “augmentation of
[libel] harms” 68 made possible by the Internet.
A. The Internet and a Renewed Chilling Effect
First, it is difficult to overstate the importance of the Internet to
truly democratic public discourse on matters of public concern.69
The Internet provides ordinary citizens with unprecedented access to
“channels of effective communication” 70 once reserved solely for
public figures and media outlets. 71 Blogs, social media, and other
Internet fora provide cheap and easily accessible mass
communication unheard of in previous eras. 72 In short, “the Internet
promises to eliminate structural and financial barriers to meaningful
public discourse, thereby making public discourse more democratic
and inclusive, less subject to the control of powerful speakers, and, at
least potentially, richer and more nuanced.” 73 In short, the Internet
may very well be an embodiment of the “marketplace of ideas”
beyond anything previously conceived. 74

FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 176, 199 (2009).
66. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 945 (2000) (“The chief threat posed by the new cases is that
powerful corporate plaintiffs will use libel law to intimidate their critics into silence and, by
doing so, will blunt the effectiveness of the Internet as a medium for empowering ordinary
citizens to play a meaningful role in public discourse.”).
67. Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457,
1461 (2012).
68. Id.
69. Richards, supra note 65.
70. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
71. Lidsky, supra note 66, at 894–95.
72. Id.; Richards, supra note 65.
73. Lidsky, supra note 66, at 894.
74. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (“It is no exaggeration
to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory
marketplace of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has yet seen.”).
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Unfortunately, along with democratized access to mass media
comes a concomitant potential for liability for online speech. 75 The
“chilling effect” that plagued legacy media sources in decades past
has “particular resonance in cases involving ‘nonmedia’ defendants
like those typically sued in the new Internet libel cases.” 76 This
“chilling effect” is familiar in the law—fear of it drove the creation of
the New York Times “actual malice” standard for defamation claims
against public officials 77 and the subsequent extension of that
standard to “public figures” in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 78 This
standard raised the burden of proof necessary to prove defamation
claims if the plaintiff was a public official or one of several classes of
public figure. 79 In instituting this standard, the Court was willing to
tolerate “erroneous statement[s]” as an inevitable component of free
debate. 80 And, in order to prevent a broader “chilling effect” on
public discourse, the Court was willing to tolerate the potentially
“melancholy and unfair results” that the standard might yield for
victims of defamation who were unable to meet the heightened
burden of proof. 81
Similarly, Pring and Canan asserted that SLAPPs affect not only
the target of the SLAPP, but other citizens observing the legal circus
who might be fearful of speaking out in future. 82 Referring to the
propensity of SLAPPs to chill speech, Pring and Canan found that
“SLAPP exposure or awareness make[s] a difference.” 83 That is, the
news of the travails of SLAPP targets and the implied threat of
coercive litigation combine to discourage others in the community
from speaking out or participating in public issues for fear of similar
retaliation. 84 The Internet, with its ability to disseminate even

75. See Lidsky, supra note 66, at 888–89.
76. Id. at 889.
77. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300–01 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (“The opinion of the Court conclusively demonstrates the chilling effect of the
Alabama libel laws on First Amendment freedoms. . . .”).
78. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
79. See JOSEPH F. SCHUSTER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN THE BALANCE 223–
28 (1993).
80. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271.
81. See SCHUSTER, supra note 79, at 224.
82. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 2–3.
83. Id. at 219.
84. Canan opined, perhaps a bit melodramatically,
[W]e can never calculate the ripple effects of this attempt to silence effective public
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peculiarly local news nationally85 and internationally, 86 has the
potential to amplify the chilling effect of individual, local SLAPPs by
spreading news of their occurrence far and wide. If exposure to the
very idea of SLAPPs was theoretically enough to discourage local
speech thirty years ago, news of SLAPPs broadcast 87 instantaneously
to massive and diverse Internet audiences across the country poses a
considerably greater threat to the marketplace of ideas here and now.
As significantly more people are exposed to the idea of being sued
for their everyday speech online, significantly more people could be
discouraged from participation online. In other words, the chilling
effect that troubled Pring and Canan could find redoubled vigor.
B. The Internet and Amplified Harm from Libel
At the same time, the Internet also has the potential to drastically
amplify the harms caused by libelous statements. This is because the
Internet increases the ability of ordinary users to cause significantly
more reputational damage than would be possible with traditional
media. While Pring and Canan played down resource inequality as a
opposition. What about the impact of this lawsuit on scores of people who have read
newspaper reports about the plight of these citizens? What about friends and
families who have received letters describing the ordeal? What about Boy Scout and
Girl Scout leaders who, as a result of these suits, grow up to circumscribe their
wholly enthusiastic invocations to “get involved” with gusto? Like the pebble
thrown in the water, a single SLAPP can have effects far beyond its initial impact.
Canan, supra note 28, at 30.
85. See Keith Coffman, Denver Teacher’s Third Grade Assignment Goes Viral Online,
YAHOO NEWS (Apr. 17, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/denver-teachers-thirdgrade-assignment-goes-viral-online-224846727.html (describing a Denver teacher’s
assignment to her third-grade class that gained national recognition under the hashtag
“#WishMyTeacherKnew”).
86. Terrance F. Ross, The Math Question That Went Viral, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/04/the-math-question-that-wentviral/390411/ (describing a particularly baffling Singaporean primary school homework
problem that was posted online and spread internationally via Twitter, Reddit, and Facebook).
87. See, e.g., Dan Frosch, Venting Online, Consumers Can Find Themselves in Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/us/01slapp.html
(describing a defamation suit filed by a towing company against Justin Kurtz, who created a
Facebook page to criticize the business after they towed his car). Neatly summarizing the First
Amendment concerns, Kurtz stated, “‘There’s no reason I should have to shut up because
some guy doesn’t want his dirty laundry out . . . . It’s the power of the Internet, man.’” Id.
Indeed. See also Elizabeth Hartfield, Bad Yelp Review Results in Lawsuit for Virginia Woman,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/woman-sued-giving-badonline-reviews/story?id=17894367 (describing a Virginia resident’s legal battle over her
negative online review of a local contractor, which the contractor claimed was defamatory).
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hallmark of SLAPP suits, 88 much of the rhetoric and justification for
anti-SLAPP legislation has leaned on a David versus Goliath trope. 89
The Internet upends real world David and Goliath power dynamics
by giving David a technological edge. 90 In simplest terms, the
Internet allows ordinary users to “target a message to an audience
with common interests and concerns, the very audience likely to be
most receptive to [their] comments.” 91 This allows ordinary
individual users to cause significantly more damage to targets with
defamatory attacks than would otherwise be possible in the
real world. 92
Two other peculiar aspects of Internet discourse make
defamatory statements published online particularly volatile: virality
and permanence. First, the potential for libel to “go viral” augments
the harm to defamation victims by exponentially expanding the reach
of libelous statements. “Because . . . defamatory statements can be
copied and posted in other Internet discussion fora, both the
potential audience and the subsequent potential for harm are
magnified.” 93 Indeed, viral content shared via social networks spreads
much like an epidemic, spilling over from one network to another in
rapid succession. 94
Next, the Internet rarely forgets. 95 As one commentator observed,

88. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 216 (“Clearly wrong is the view of most SLAPPs
as ‘Goliath versus David’ contests, of big corporations suing the little guy. These are present
but rare; SLAPP filers are overwhelmingly local Davids suing local Davids, even though they
may be bigger frogs in their local pond.”).
89. See BYRON SHELDRICK, BLOCKING PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: THE USE OF
STRATEGIC LITIGATION TO SILENCE POLITICAL EXPRESSION 44 (2014) (discussing Canadian
SLAPP cases that “demonstrate[] the inequality of resources that frequently make SLAPPs a
David v. Goliath type litigation”); Guarding Against The Chill, supra note 57 (describing
typical SLAPP filers as “corporations, real estate developers, government officials and others”);
Leslie Machado, David v. Goliath in DC Superior Court, D.C. ANTI-SLAPP L. (Sep. 23,
2014), http://dcslapplaw.com/2014/09/23/david-v-goliath-in-dc-superior-court/.
90. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, DAVID AND GOLIATH: UNDERDOGS, MISFITS, AND
THE ART OF BATTLING GIANTS 9–12 (2013) (arguing that the technological advantage of the
sling made the biblical David more than a match for the lumbering Goliath).
91. Lidsky, supra note 66, at 884.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 884–85.
94. See Lilian Weng et al., Virality Prediction and Community Structure in Social
Networks,
3
SCI.
REP.
2522
(Aug.
28,
2013),
http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130828/srep02522/full/srep02522.html.
95. Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
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We’ve known for years that the Web allows for unprecedented
voyeurism, exhibitionism and inadvertent indiscretion, but we are
only now beginning to understand the costs of an age in which so
much of what we say, and of what others say about us, goes into our
permanent—and public—digital files. 96

Permanence on a grand scale is possible because online data can
be copied and stored by multiple users, even when the original data
has been deleted by its creator. 97 Thus, libelous statements, once
typed into a comments section or any other Internet forum, are
unlikely to ever fully go away. 98 Further, libelous statements are likely
to attach to a victim’s name in aggregated search results, tarnishing
their reputation again and again in perpetuity. 99
Thus, the Internet provides an easily accessible platform for
“unscrupulous or merely reckless” individuals to “pollute the
information stream with defamatory falsehoods” that may spread
virally out of control, and linger long after the controversy has
ended. 100 If anti-SLAPP laws make it too difficult for a defamation
claim to survive an initial motion, victims of pernicious Internet
defamation may find no remedy in the courts.
III. THE NEW DYNAMIC EXPLORED
To further explore this new dynamic of heightened risk for
speakers and those they speak about, two real-world defamation
actions are instructive. Both cases demonstrate the chill of
threatened litigation in cyberspace and the greater potential for harm
posed by online defamation. More importantly, both cases have
significant implications for anti-SLAPP theory. The first case, Oberst
v. Faircloth, 101 demonstrates the murky morality of online defamation
and gives a taste of the new balance of interests at play in modern

see also Lidsky, supra note 66, at 885 (“[A]s the persistence of Internet hoaxes demonstrates,
once a rumor takes hold in cyber space, it may be almost impossible to root out.”)
(footnote omitted).
96. Rosen, supra note 95 (emphasis added).
97. See Bernstein, supra note 67, at 1480–81.
98. See id. at 1480 (“Durability, the second level of extra harm associated with virtual
injuries, derives from the truism that anything put into the virtual world tends to linger.”).
99. Id. at 1481.
100. See Lidsky, supra note 66, at 884.
101. Complaint, Oberst v. Faircloth, No. 1:14-cv-01031 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2014),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1026992/co-complaint.pdf.
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SLAPPs. The second case, Wong v. Jing, 102 shows that even the most
mundane of Internet interaction can trigger a SLAPP. Importantly,
both cases implicate anti-SLAPP laws, but neither case resembles the
paradigm SLAPP originally contemplated by those laws. 103
A. Oberst v. Faircloth
In December of 2013, feminist discussion forum xoJane posted
an essay entitled “IT HAPPENED TO ME: I Dated a Famous Rock
Star & All I Got Was Punched in the Face” authored by an
anonymous user. 104 The article recounted the author’s relationship
with an unnamed “rock star boyfriend-turned-attacker” who
verbally, emotionally, and physically abused her. 105 Buried in the
comments section, an anonymous commenter recounted her own
trauma at the hands of another unnamed indie musician. The
commenter claimed that the musician, a “vicious monster[,]” had
sexually assaulted and raped her when she was only sixteen. 106 Stating
that her husband had encouraged her to come forward, the author
soon identified her attacker as Conor Oberst, lead singer of the
popular indie band Bright Eyes and several other musical sideprojects. The commenter claimed that Oberst “took advantage of
[her] teenage crush on him” and sexually assaulted her backstage at a
concert in North Carolina. 107 Despite being quickly deleted, the
comments were copied, shared, and archived by thousands of
Tumblr accounts and various other blogs, 108 garnering the attention

102. 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 747 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
103. As discussed supra notes 28, 89 and accompanying text, “The paradigm SLAPP is a
suit filed by a large land developer against environmental activists or a neighborhood
association intended to chill the defendants’ continued political or legal opposition to the
developers’ plans.” Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815 (1994).
104. Anonymous, IT HAPPENED TO ME: I Dated a Famous Rock Star & All I Got
Was Punched in the Face, XOJANE (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.xojane.com/it-happened-tome/it-happened-to-me-i-dated-a-famous-rock-star-all-i-got-was-punched-in-the-face
[hereinafter IT HAPPENED TO ME].
105. Id.
(Jan.
3,
2014),
106. Conor
Oberst:
Rapist,
URBANCATFITTERS
http://urbancatfitters.com/post/72164714862/conor-oberst-rapist
[hereinafter
URBANCATFITTERS].
107. Jessica Testa, Conor Oberst Accused of Raping Teenager 10 Years Ago, Denies
Allegations, BUZZFEED (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/conor-oberstresponds-to-rape-allegations-left-by-anonymous#.hb66M0yyy.
108. See id.; see also URBANCATFITTERS, supra note 106.
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of major news outlets. 109 Oberst’s publicist responded swiftly,
threatening litigation: “‘Conor has nothing but abhorrence for the
perpetrators of such crimes of sexual violence. The behavior
attributed to him by this individual is in direct opposition to his
principles. Conor is consulting with a libel attorney regarding
this matter.’” 110
Because the commenter’s xoJane handle was linked to her
Facebook account, she was quickly identified as Joanie Faircloth, a
young resident of North Carolina. 111 Faircloth took to her Tumblr
account to further explain her comments. 112 She also accused
Oberst’s lawyers of offering her “‘hush money’” to recant her
allegations. 113 Many outlets expressed solidarity with Faircloth,114
including some of Oberst’s diehard fans. 115
Shortly after Faircloth was identified, Oberst filed a lawsuit in
diversity in the Southern District of New York, alleging libel and
seeking one million dollars in damages. 116 Oberst’s father and
business manager filed a declaration with the court claiming that
Oberst had lost at least $500,000 117 in album sales 118 and tour

109. See, e.g., Chris Martins, Conor Oberst Denies Anonymous Rape Allegation, Consults
Lawyer, SPIN (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.spin.com/articles/conor-oberst-anonymous-rapeallegation-response-libel/; Testa, supra note 107.
110. Martins, supra note 109 (alteration in original).
111. Tracie Egan Morrissey, Rape, Lies and the Internet: The Story of Conor Oberst and
His Accuser, JEZEBEL (Feb. 28, 2014), http://jezebel.com/rape-lies-and-the-internet-thestory-of-conor-oberst-1531785539.
112. Id. Faircloth posted under the handle “xoJaneCommenter.” Id.
113. Alan Duke, Woman Recants Conor Oberst Rape Story: ‘I made up those lies’, CNN
(July 14, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/14/showbiz/conor-oberst-rape-recanted/.
114. S. W. Kiley, Why I Believe Conor Oberst’s Anonymous Rape Accuser, FRISKY (Jan. 8,
2014),
http://www.thefrisky.com/2014-01-08/why-i-believe-conor-obersts-anonymousrape-accuser/.
115. See id.; URBANCATFITTERS, supra note 106 (quoting a Tumblr post by user
“oberstingwithconor” that stated, in part, “It doesn’t make sense for her to be fabricating this
story[.] The kind of attention this will bring is something nobody would want. Think about it.
Also, Conor was notorious for sleeping with younger girls during that time. Through running
this blog I’ve heard many stories that confirm this.”). This single reblog has been “liked” or
reblogged into the thousands. Id.
116. Jason Newman, Conor Oberst Files Libel Lawsuit over Rape Allegations, ROLLING
STONE (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/conor-oberst-files-libellawsuit-over-rape-allegations-20140220; Complaint at 3, Oberst v. Faircloth, No. 1:14-cv01031-KBF
(S.D.N.Y.
Feb.
19,
2014),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1026992/co-complaint.pdf.
117. Jessica Testa, No, Conor Oberst Wasn’t Fired by His Record Label over Rape
Allegation, BUZZFEED (July 8, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/jtes/tmz-wrong-about-
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revenue. 119 Several months after Oberst filed the suit, a judge issued a
default judgment against Faircloth, who failed to appear. 120
Later that month, Faircloth released a notarized statement
recanting her allegations against Oberst and apologizing for harming
his reputation and possibly making the reporting of sexual assaults
and rapes more difficult for victims. 121
1. Implications for anti-SLAPP
No anti-SLAPP statute was invoked in Oberst’s lawsuit—the suit
never really made it to court. Oberst dropped the suit shortly after
Faircloth’s apology hit the major news outlets. 122 Nevertheless,
Faircloth’s accusations against Oberst mirror a dynamic at the heart
of anti-SLAPP legislation: the inherent tension between defamation
law and an “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public discourse.123
More importantly, their story demonstrates that both aspects of that
dynamic are amplified by the peculiarities of the Internet. It should
be noted that this Comment takes no position on whether or not
Oberst was justified in his lawsuit or whether Faircloth was, in fact,
telling the truth. Instead, the story is presented solely to explore the
entanglement of anti-SLAPP legislation with exceedingly sensitive
public discourse and Internet defamation.

conor-oberst#.foaMA3GGG.
118. Oberst was set to release a new album shortly after the allegations surfaced. See
Evan Minsker & Amy Phillips, Conor Oberst Announces New Album Upside Down Mountain
(Feb.
11,
2014),
and
Tour,
Shares
“Hundreds
of
Ways,”
PITCHFORK
http://pitchfork.com/news/53917-conor-oberst-announces-new-album-upside-downmountain-and-tour-shares-hundreds-of-ways/. Oberst’s father claimed that certain media
outlets, including National Public Radio, had refused to host Oberst or promote his album,
and a music publisher had unceremoniously dumped him because of the allegations. See Testa,
supra note 117.
119. One of Oberst’s side projects, Desaparecidos, cancelled an Australian tour shortly
before the suit was filed. Morrissey, supra note 111.
120. Duke, supra note 113.
121. See Jeremy Gordon, Conor Oberst Rape Accuser Issues Public Apology, PITCHFORK
(July 14, 2014), http://pitchfork.com/news/55885-conor-oberst-rape-accuser-issues-publicapology/.
122. Kory Grow, Conor Oberst Drops Libel Lawsuit Against Rape Accuser Following Her
STONE
(July
21,
2014),
Apology,
ROLLING
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/conor-oberst-drops-libel-lawsuit-against-rapeaccuser-20140721.
123. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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a. Increased chilling effect. First, Oberst’s suit, right or wrong, bears
many of the hallmarks of a SLAPP, especially the significant chilling
effect on future speech. For instance, Oberst filed in the Southern
District of New York, far from Faircloth’s home in North Carolina.
Filing in a far-away jurisdiction can stretch a target’s resources,
forcing them to capitulate rather than attempt to litigate at a
distance. 124 Further, Oberst, as a successful musician and producer,
has significantly more resources to throw at a large-scale civil lawsuit
than Faircloth, who was apparently under significant financial
strain. 125 While Pring and Canan found that, at that time, many
SLAPP filers were economically equal with their targets, 126 many
filers in modern SLAPPs have “extensive resources” that are used to
“bury opponents in expensive litigation.” 127 Finally, Oberst withdrew
the lawsuit only after Faircloth recanted. As noted above, the filer of
a SLAPP is not truly seeking damages from a target. The filer only
wants the target’s silence. 128
Thus, while many facts indicate otherwise, 129 it is still within the
realm of possibility that Faircloth was, in fact, telling the truth. Only
she and Oberst know what did or did not happen at that concert
over a decade ago. If Faircloth was telling the truth, the threat of
Oberst’s lawsuit was a SLAPP that effectively silenced her legitimate
speech on a serious issue of public concern in a public forum.130
Moreover, even if Faircloth was lying, Oberst’s very public threat of
a million-dollar lawsuit may have chilled other legitimate, truthful
speech regarding sexual violence against women. Certain outlets that

124. See Lidsky, supra note 66, at 891–92.
125. See Morrissey, supra note 111.
126. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 220.
127. Miller, supra note 42.
128. Supra note 21and accompanying text; see also Tate, supra note 16, at 803–04.
129. The first and most damning fact is, of course, the signed and notarized retraction of
the accusation. See Gordon, supra note 121. There are also several significant inconsistencies in
her story of the attack and other problematic instances of dishonest Internet activity from Ms.
Faircloth’s past. See generally Morrissey, supra note 111.
130. While it is unclear whether any state anti-SLAPP statute would have applied in this
federal suit, the state in which the suit was filed, New York, does have an anti-SLAPP statute
that emphasizes the need to protect “the free exercise of speech . . . particularly when such
rights are exercised in a public forum with respect to issues of public concern.” See Yeshiva
Chofetz Chaim Radin, Inc. v. Village of New Hempstead, 98 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (citing legislative history of New York’s Anti-SLAPP measure). In any event, because
the lawsuit was brought in diversity, a federal anti-SLAPP measure could have applied had one
been in place at the time. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
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reported on Oberst’s lawsuit identified this very dynamic 131 and some
called for Oberst to drop the suit, even if Faircloth’s accusations
were untrue. 132 Internet news outlets carried this story nationally and
internationally, potentially reinforcing a damaging “rape culture”
narrative. 133 Actual victims of sexual assault might see Faircloth,
threatened with legal action in a faraway state by her alleged attacker,
and decide that speaking up is dangerous. This is precisely the
chilling effect that Pring and Canan asserted results from SLAPP
suits, 134 but on a much grander scale.
While a federal anti-SLAPP law would likely have applied in this
instance, 135 it is unclear whether the statute would have protected
Faircloth from protracted litigation. Oberst, a public figure, would
likely have to prove a “sufficient prima facie showing of facts to
sustain a favorable judgment” 136 by at least indicating actual malice. 137
Nevertheless, “it may be relatively easy for plaintiffs to establish
actual malice” because of the “reckless [or] perhaps indifferent”
nature of online communication. 138 Thus, an anti-SLAPP statute that

131. See Joy Wagner, Despite Rape Allegations, Conor Oberst Still Has a Career,
FEMINIST CURRENT (Jun. 18, 2014), http://feministcurrent.com/9168/despite-rapeallegations-conor-oberst-still-has-a-career/ (arguing that Oberst’s lawsuit was a demonstration
of rape culture and may very well contribute to the silence of other victims of sexual assault).
132. See Marc Hogan, Conor Oberst Urged to Drop Libel Suit Against Alleged Rape
Victim, SPIN (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.spin.com/articles/conor-oberst-urged-droplawsuit-rape-right-speak-out/ (“Right to Speak Out says [the] lawsuit could discourage sexual
assault victims from coming forward.”).
133. See Wagner, supra note 131.
134. PRING & CANAN, supra note 2, at 219.
135. The Citizen Participation Act of 2009, a federal anti-SLAPP bill proposed but not
passed in 2009. Kimberly Chow, Federal Anti-SLAPP Bill Introduced in the House, REP.
COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (May 15, 2015), https://www.rcfp.org/browse-medialaw-resources/news/federal-anti-slapp-bill-introduced-house, would have granted protection
to “any written or oral statement made in a . . . public forum in connection with an issue of
public interest.” Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. § 11(1)(B)
(2009). Other model statutes have similar provisions. Brown & Goldowitz, supra note 7, at 7.
A more recently proposed federal anti-SLAPP bill, the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, appears to
eliminate the public forum requirement, but purports to protect any “oral or written statement
or other expression . . . that was made in connection with an official proceeding or about a
matter of public concern . . . .” SPEAK FREE Act of 2015, H.R. 2304, 114th Cong. § 2
(2015). As discussed previously, websites are typically considered public forums, supra note 63
and accompanying text, and the topic of a public figure allegedly sexually assaulting or raping
an underage girl is almost certainly an issue of public interest or concern.
136. H.R. 4364 § 5(b).
137. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
138. Lidsky, supra note 66, at 919.
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only requires a “prima facie showing” or “reasonable likelihood of
success” may not do much to protect Faircloth, and may even send a
broader message that the law cannot protect important
online speech.
b. Increased damage from libel. As the potential chill of defamation
actions moves more rapidly through cyberspace, so too does actual
libel. Indeed, as Oberst’s publicist observed soon after the initial
accusations had exploded online: “‘[T]he internet allows for
groundless statements like this to travel the world before the truth
has any time to surface.’” 139 Indeed, the Internet, amplified by social
networks, contributes to what Professor Anita Bernstein calls an
“augmentation of harm” from libel. 140 It would be easy to
characterize Faircloth and Oberst’s confrontation as a “David versus
Goliath” struggle, but “this characterization ignores the power that
the Internet gives irresponsible speakers to damage the reputations
of their targets.” 141 Instead, the Internet
helps equalize power imbalances in the real world by giving
anonymous John Does . . . a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
In the online world, every [user] is potentially a publisher, capable
of transmitting messages instantaneously to millions of readers.
More significantly, the Internet allows [a user] to target a message
to an audience with common interests and concerns, the very
audience likely to be most receptive to his comments. 142

Thus, a David like Faircloth was able to do significant damage to
a public-figure Goliath like Oberst with little more than a few typed
words in the comments section of a rather obscure website.
Faircloth’s accusations set off an electronic wildfire throughout
Tumblr and other social media outlets. Individual users quickly
disseminated Faircloth’s story thousands and thousands of times
over. The accusations quickly spread from individual-to-individual
social networks to larger pop culture websites, such as Buzzfeed, and
eventually to established national news sites, such as CNN.com.143

139. Testa, supra note 107.
140. Bernstein, supra note 67, at 1461.
141. Lidsky, supra note 66, 865 (discussing large corporate plaintiffs suing individual
anonymous Internet users for defamation).
142. Id. at 884.
143. Duke, supra note 113.
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“By the time Oberst issued a statement denying the allegations, it
was seemingly too late. People believed he was a rapist. Even his diehard fans were conflicted.” 144
Faircloth’s accusations also clearly demonstrate the permanence
of Internet libel: Faircloth herself, or xoJane moderators, deleted the
initial accusations, but not before other users had taken screenshots
or otherwise archived the content and disseminated it to countless
other users through social media. 145 Even after Faircloth publicly
recanted and apologized, the sting of the accusations lingers: “For a
lot of people out there, there will always be a question mark next to
Oberst’s name, a mark that nothing will be able to erase.” 146 This is
particularly true because the whole ordeal will forever be associated
with Oberst’s name in search engines that will churn up the
accusations again and again. 147
B. Wong v. Jing
A second story demonstrates that newly expanded anti-SLAPP
laws touch even the most commonplace electronic interaction—the
online gripe. Sometime in 2006, Tai Jing and Jia Ma, husband and
wife, brought their young son to Yvonne Wong, a local dentist, for a
checkup. 148 Wong filled a cavity in the boy’s mouth using a silver
amalgam that contained trace amounts of mercury. 149 Wong
remembered explaining to Ma that, despite their mercury content,
silver amalgam fillings were perfectly safe and widely used. 150 In fact,
Wong typically provided patients with paperwork explaining the risks
and advantages of silver amalgam along with a consent form for
minor children. 151
Two years later, Ma scheduled another checkup for her son, but
abruptly cancelled and was charged a late-cancellation fee. 152 The

144.
145.
146.

Morrissey, supra note 111.
Id.
Tom Hawking, The Sad, Strange Aftermath of the Conor Oberst Rape Accusations,
FLAVORWIRE (July 17, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://flavorwire.com/467845/the-sad-strangeaftermath-of-the-conor-oberst-rape-accusations.
147. See Bernstein, supra note 67, at 1461.
148. Wong v. Tai Jing, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 755 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 762.
151. Id. at 756.
152. Id.
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next month, when Ma arrived for the rescheduled appointment, her
son was noticeably fussy. He squirmed in the chair and refused to sit
still for x-rays of his teeth. Despite this difficulty, Wong was able to
diagnose two cavities on the right side of the boy’s mouth. Perhaps
frustrated by the extra effort needed to keep the boy still, Wong
deferred further x-rays. Nevertheless, believing the boy had more
cavities on the unexamined side of his mouth, Wong instructed Ma
to schedule a return appointment. 153 When Ma discovered that
Wong’s office could not accommodate her son that weekend due to
staffing issues, the topic of the previous month’s missed appointment
came up again. After some argument, Wong agreed to waive the late
cancellation fee as a concession for being unable to accommodate
Ma that weekend—or simply to placate a difficult customer.
Frustrated with the whole ordeal, Ma refused to set up another
appointment, demanded her son’s dental health files, and ostensibly
consulted another dentist. 154
Shortly after this tiff, a scathing review appeared on Yelp.com
under Dr. Wong’s business listing authored by Tai Jing, Ma’s
husband. 155 Tai Jing wished aloud that Yelp had a zero star rating, as
opposed to the lowest one-star rating currently allowed by the site,
153.
154.
155.

Wong, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 762.
Id. at 756.
The full review, as quoted in the court’s opinion, read as follows:
“1 star rating. [] Let me first say I wish there is [sic] ‘0’ star in Yelp rating.
Avoid [Dr. Wong] like a disease! [] My son went there for two years. She
treated two cavities plus the usual cleaning. She was fast, I mean really fast. I
won’t necessarily say that is a bad thing, but my son was light headed for
several hours after the filling. So we decided to try another dentist after half a
year. [] I wish I had gone there earlier. First the new dentist discovered seven
cavities. All right all of those appeared during the last half a year. Second, he
would never use the laughing gas on kids, which was the cause for my son’s
dizziness. To apply laughing gas is the easiest to the dentist. There is no
waiting, no needles. But it is general anesthetic, not local. And general
anesthetic harms a kid’s nerve system. Heck, it harms mine too. Third, the
filling Yvonne Wong used is metallic silver color. The new dentist would only
use the newer, white color filling. Why does that matter? Here is the part that
made me really, really angry. The color tells the material being used. The
metallic filling, called silver amalgams [sic], has a small trace of mercury in it.
The newer composite filling, while costing the dentist more, does not. In
addition, it uses a newer technology to embed fluoride to clean the teeth for
you. [] I regret ever going to her office. [] P.S. Just want to add one more
thing. Dr Chui, who shares the same office with Yvonne Wong is
actually decent.”
Id. at 755.
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and advised potential clients to avoid Wong “like a disease!” 156 The
review implied that Wong failed to advise Ma about the potential
risks of silver amalgam fillings, missed several cavities during the
examination, and used a potentially dangerous general anesthetic to
incapacitate the child. 157
Wong filed suit against Ma and Jing for defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and against Yelp for
refusing to remove the review from their website. 158 The defendants
collectively filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Yelp
constituted a public forum under California’s anti-SLAPP law. 159 The
lower court denied Ma and Tai Jing’s motion, and Wong voluntarily
dismissed the charges against Yelp. 160 The court of appeals reversed in
part, granting the anti-SLAPP motion for Ma and dismissing the
claims for infliction of emotional distress. 161 Nonetheless, the court
allowed the case against Tai Jing to proceed, ruling that Wong had
“made a prima facie showing of probable success on her cause of
action for libel [against Jing]” because Jing’s review contained
disprovable assertions of fact that a jury could reasonably believe
constituted libel. 162
1. Implications for anti-SLAPP
This little bit of local legal theatre again sets the stage for a much
broader conflict of competing interests: the potentially far-reaching
chilling effect of such lawsuits on public participation in consumer
reviews and other online discourse, and the amplified damage
inflicted on businesses and individuals by online gripes.
a. Amplified chilling effect. First, the threat of libel suits based on
offhand online reviews may have a severe impact on the quantity and
quality of online reviews in general. While we may not have a great
deal of sympathy for Jing and his scathing review, it must be
remembered that he was speaking as a layman receiving what he
interpreted as conflicting information from two experienced
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 753–58.
159. Id. at 755.
160. Id. at 756–58.
161. Id. at 768–69.
162. Id. at 766.
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practitioners. If Jing was sore over a spat between his wife and the
dentist and decided to retaliate online, then his liability for
defamation seems fair. But, if he simply misunderstood the technical
information on filling compounds and the difference between
anesthetics that was given to him by a second dentist, liability for
simply relaying such information seems less just. As one
commentator observed, “Writing a legally defensible online rant is
unexpectedly tricky. You’re free to vent, but you’re not free to make
false statements of fact, and the distinction between venting and
defamation isn’t always clear.” 163 If the line between online
defamation and online venting is unclear and the current structure of
even the most expansive anti-SLAPP laws is not enough to protect
an online misstep from liability, then “many would choose to forego
speaking in the future to avoid the hassle and expense of [potential]
libel litigation.” 164 Thus, the online spread 165 of stories such as Wong
v. Jing and other consumer gripe suits may “encourage[] prospective
speakers to engage in undue self-censorship to avoid the negative
consequences of speaking.” 166 Such prospective self-censorship is
likely to undermine the potential pool of consumer information and
the overall willingness of users to speak out about consumer
experiences (or anything of any social value) online. This chilling
effect is especially potent because Wong successfully overcame an
anti-SLAPP challenge to her case. Thus, in the context of antiSLAPP legislation, it should be questioned whether the “likelihood

163. Eric Goldman, Blasting Your Landlord Online? Pick Your Words Wisely, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/08/12/blasting-yourlandlord-online-pick-your-words-wisely/.
164. See Lidsky, supra note 66, at 892.
165. The story of Wong and Jing appears to have remained fairly local. See Deborah
Gage, Dentist Sues Over Negative Yelp Review, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Dentist-sues-over-negative-Yelp-review3176311.php. Nevertheless, consumer gripe lawsuits can and do become national news. See,
e.g., Justin Jouvenal, $750K Lawsuit Over Yelp Review Will Go to Trial, WASH. POST (Jan. 27,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/750k-lawsuit-over-yelp-review-will-goto-trial/2014/01/26/63e9d372-8539-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html; Chris Morran,
Obedience School Sues Yelper for $65K Over Negative Review, CONSUMERIST (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://consumerist.com/2015/03/26/obedience-school-sues-yelper-for-65k-over-negativereview/; Lauren Evans, Watch Repairman Sues Yelp Reviewer Over Negative Feedback,
(Mar.
21,
2014),
GOTHAMIST
http://gothamist.com/2014/03/21/watch_repairman_sues_yelpers.php.
166. See Lidsky, supra note 66, at 888 (footnote omitted).
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of success” standard applied in Wong is high enough to protect
against the true chilling effect of SLAPP-like suits on nonparties. 167
b. Amplified harm from libel. On the other hand, as stated above, the
Internet can rapidly amplify the damage caused by libelous
statements. In the context of consumer gripe sites such as Yelp, the
damage caused to businesses can be especially severe. For example, a
Harvard Business School study that evaluated the effect that Yelp
reviews have on restaurant demand found that an increase of one
star in a restaurant’s rating can make a 5-9% difference in annual
revenue. 168 Further, Yelp’s penetration has actually warped the
market, driving consumers towards independent restaurants and
away from chains. 169 And, because consumers gauge the quality of
independent restaurants largely on their online reviews, Yelp’s
influence on the market may be critical to success or failure of
individual restaurants. 170 While this particular study did not extend
beyond the restaurant market, the implications for any business (or
dental practice) are clear: you may live or die by your online
reputation. 171 Because consumers take online ratings as a “public
signal of quality[,]” 172 maliciously negative or false reviews could
irrevocably damage business prospects by driving countless potential
consumers away. 173 Consumer sites like Yelp provide potential

167. See Wong, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760. It is worth noting that Wong’s suit bore some
resemblance to a SLAPP. For instance, in an interview with a Bay Area news outlet, Wong
herself stated, “I don’t want these lies to be posted on the Web site [sic] about me[.] . . . I’m
not looking for money.” Gage, supra note 165. Thus, like many SLAPP filers, Wong was
looking to silence Jing, not to collect damages. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
168. See Michael Luca, Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.com 2
(Harvard
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
12-016,
2011),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-016_0464f20e-35b2-492e-a328fb14a325f718.pdf. While the study does not specifically address the effects of a one-star
decrease on small businesses, it is clear that “a restaurant’s average rating has a large impact on
revenue[,]” id. at 4, and the likely effects of negative reviews on the revenue of individual
businesses is easily inferred from the study’s findings.
169. Id. at 5.
170. See id. at 4–5.
171. See, e.g., Max Fisher, From Gamergate to Cecil the lion: internet mob justice is out of
control, VOX (July 30, 2015), http://www.vox.com/2015/7/30/9074865/cecil-lionpalmer-mob-justice (describing the potency of the social media attacks on real-life targets,
especially the use of Yelp and other business sites to destroy the dental practice of Walter
Palmer, who killed Cecil the Lion in 2015).
172. See Luca, supra note 168, at 19.
173. See Fisher, supra note 171 (citation omitted) (“They went after his business, a
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libelers with easy access to a public platform, amplifying the impact
of their defamatory attacks.
While these negative effects may be essentially confined to local
consumers, the possibility of a particular review going viral is ever
present—like, for instance, a lukewarm review of a small-town Olive
Garden that somehow ended up in the Wall Street Journal. 174 Thus,
both the actual and potential damage inherent in such reviews is
extensive. Further, many reviews are more or less permanent, 175 as is
demonstrated by Yelp’s refusal to remove Tai Jing’s scathing review
upon Wong’s request. 176 Some review sites, such as Ripoff Report, do
not allow even original authors to retract their reviews. 177 Taken
together, the advent of consumer sites has a profound effect on
business—particularly if those businesses are defamed. Accordingly, if
anti-SLAPP laws are not properly calibrated to protect the interests
of businesses and individuals harmed by online gripes, the potential
for damage is extensive.
The cases outlined above are a far cry from the quintessential
SLAPP outlined by Pring and Canan decades ago. They are also a far
cry from the rhetoric employed by policymakers to justify the
passage of anti-SLAPP laws today. And yet it is clear that anti-SLAPP
statutes are being applied to such cases in increasing numbers. The
anti-SLAPP laws currently on the books and pending in various

private dental practice, posting thousands of negative reviews on Yelp and other sites. The
practice has since shut down.”).
174. See James R. Hagerty, When Mom Goes Viral, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052702304537904577275683631110396lMyQjAxMTAyMDEwMzExNDMyWj.html?mod=wsj_share_email (describing the online
furor over eighty-five year old Marilyn Hagerty’s online review of Grand Fork’s new Olive
Garden restaurant as “impressive”). It should be noted, however, that Hagerty’s review, which
emphasized the “‘warmth of the décor’” without much praise for the chicken Alfredo, was
published online in her local newspaper, and not a consumer review site. Id. Nevertheless, her
explosive rise from relative obscurity to social media darling indicates the power of seemingly
mundane content to spread virally.
175. Caitlin Dewey, A vengeful internet trashed the Yelp page of the Minnesota dentist who
shot Cecil the lion, WASH. POST (July 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2015/07/28/a-vengeful-internet-trashed-the-yelp-page-of-the-minnesotadentist-who-shot-cecil-the-lion/ (“[E]ven if business owners don’t want their business to
appear on [Yelp], there’s absolutely no way they can remove it.”).
176. Jing, ostensibly as a result of the suit, removed “all but one sentence of the review,
although Wong’s low one-star rating remains on Yelp.” Gage, supra note 165.
177. Eric Goldman, The Latest Insidious Tactic to Scrub Online Consumer Reviews,
FORBES (July 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/07/23/thelatest-insidious-tactic-to-scrub-online-consumer-reviews/.
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legislatures may very well be the best answer we have to the problem
of SLAPPs and Internet defamation. Nevertheless, if policymakers
are not considering situations like those of Faircloth and Oberst or
Wong and Jing when formulating these laws, how can we be sure the
laws properly address their interests?
IV. CONCLUSION
The expansion of anti-SLAPP to public speech, particularly on
the Internet, presents a dilemma for policymakers: should they
protect the rights of petition and free speech from increased threat of
chilling, or should they protect defamation victims who are at a
significantly greater risk of harm from online libel? Obviously a
balance will need to be struck between these interests, and that
balance will inevitably depend on an adjustment of the lynchpin of
anti-SLAPP statutes—the burden of proof on the plaintiff. A higher
burden of proof 178 might mean less protection for libel victims, but a
lower burden of proof 179 might mean less protection for legitimate
speakers. The problem with current laws and legislative proposals is
that we do not actually know if the standards of proof serve either
interest properly, if at all. 180
Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical justification for antiSLAPP legislation, rooted in Pring and Canan’s decades-old study, is
in need of reevaluation. The expansion of anti-SLAPP laws into the
realm of Internet defamation law has upped the ante—the stakes for
speakers and those they speak about have risen significantly.
178. A more demanding burden of proof could be justified by appealing to the hallowed
“Marketplace of Ideas,” since a relatively easy burden of proof could chill valuable speech.
Elimination of such speech from the Marketplace of Ideas “truncates a potentially infinite
process of investigation and therefore runs a significant risk of inaccuracy.” ROBERT C. POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 161 (1995)
(footnote omitted).
179. A lesser burden of proof might be justified by the lack of social utility in defamatory
lies, which can be summarized in the cryptic adage: “[T]o live outside the law, you must be
honest[.]” BOB DYLAN, Absolutely Sweet Marie, on BLONDE ON BLONDE (Sony Music 1966).
180. For instance, the standard of proof utilized by California’s Anti-SLAPP law—a
template for many model statutes, supra note 58 and accompanying text, and a current federal
proposal, see Chow, supra note 135—was likely a concession to business interests. Tate, supra
note 16, at 818 n.86. There were many varying proposals for higher and lower standards of
proof before the California legislature settled on the current language, which requires plaintiffs
to demonstrate a probability of success, which is akin to the preponderance of the evidence
standard. See id. How effective such a compromise standard is for modern anti-SLAPP cases is
anyone’s guess.
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Policymakers should not be content to wager on research and theory
that does not address these interests. It is time to stop and assess
what effect this legislation is having on conflicts played out online
and in the courtroom—particularly relating to the burden of proof
required of the plaintiff in anti-SLAPP motions. Proceeding without
any current empirical investigation or theoretical understanding that
acknowledges and accounts for all of the interests implicated by
existing laws may undermine both the laudable goals of the
legislation and the equally laudable right to seek redress for injury in
a court of law.
Andrew L. Roth
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